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Comments on Professor Page's Discussion of
Matsushita: Plaintiffs' Perspective
Michael J. Freed*
For the past sixty years or so, courts have struggled to articulate what
constitutes illegal concerted behavior under the Sherman Act based on
the Supreme Court's formulation that such conduct requires only "a
unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting
of the minds."1 In many instances, the courts' analysis centers on the
issue of whether and when rivals' parallel conduct is, in fact, a product
of illegal price fixing. That challenge did not end with the Supreme
Court's statement of the standard for surviving summary judgment in an
antitrust case, first articulated in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp.,2 that a plaintiff must present evidence "that tends to exclude the
possibility" that alleged conspirators acted independently. 3 And since
the time Matsushita cited that standard and added the gloss that
plaintiffs "must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in
light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive
action that could not have harmed respondents," 4  courts and
commentators have formulated a variety of analyses that attempt to
explain the kind and amount of evidence necessary to meet the
Matsushita standard.
Professor Page's recent article addressing the problem is one in a
long line of commentaries that suggest analyses designed to provide
courts with a more concrete framework within which to view the
voluminous evidence typical in antitrust cases. However, in my view,
his central conclusion, that courts should include in the definition of
Michael J. Freed, a founder of and principal in the firm Freed Kanner London & Millen, LLC,
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leadership positions in numerous antitrust cases, including In re High Fructose Corn Syrup
Antitrust Litigation and In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation. The author is
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1. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
2. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
3. Id. at 764.
4. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
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"concerted action" a requirement that plaintiffs show "communication
among rivals"-both of intentions and of rivals' reliance on their
counterparts' actions in choosing a course of action-fails to clarify the
analysis. It also has the potential inadvertently to raise the bar for proof
of antitrust conspiracies, which, as courts have noted many times, are
inherently self-concealing.
5
Professor Page's comprehensive analysis of the issue and his
discussion of recent cases actually highlights the inadvisability of
introducing "communication" as an essential element of proof. In the
three recent cases Professor Page discusses, the courts attempt to
determine whether the evidence that plaintiffs have been able to develop
to resist summary judgment, viewed as a whole, is sufficient to show
that the inference of conspiracy was reasonable. To require evidence of
"communication" would not clarify the courts' task, however; rather,
such a requirement would create yet another definitional morass: What
is a "communication"? Jury instructions can run to many pages just
attempting to guide prospective jurors about this. Further, such a
requirement, at least as Professor Page presents it, carries the significant
danger that courts will simplify the effort and look only for
conversations among rivals explicitly reflecting intention on the one
hand and competitors' reliance on the other hand, ignoring the
inferences that arise from the totality of the evidence.
Nowhere was this problem highlighted better than in the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in the High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation.
6
In that opinion, Judge Posner discussed three traps defendants typically
lay for courts that must determine whether a price-fixing case should
survive summary judgment: (1) invading the province of the jury by
weighing conflicting evidence; (2) concluding that the evidence as a
whole cannot defeat summary judgment if no single item of evidence
points unequivocally to conspiracy; and (3) "failing to distinguish
between the existence of a conspiracy and its efficacy." 7 Imposing a
communication requirement increases the danger of springing at least
5. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (holding that
..summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where... the proof
is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot."); In re
Elec. Carbon Prods. Antitrust Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312 (D.N.J. 2004); Jung v. Ass'n of
Am. Med. Coll., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 157 (D.D.C. 2004). See also King & King Enter. v.
Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding price-fixing conduct
inherently self-concealing); In re Mercedes-Benz Antitrust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 371
(D.N.J. 2001) (stating that "the self-concealing conspiracy concept is established in the antitrust
case law.").
6. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
7. Id. at 655-56.
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two of the traps with even less effort by defendants. First, imposing a
communication requirement will not just invade the province of the
jury; such a requirement threatens to swallow the jury's duty whole.
There is the risk that courts may look at and weigh only evidence of
communication, determine whether it is the "right" kind of
communication, and ignore everything else.
Second, imposing a communication requirement may exacerbate
courts' tendency to fall into the trap of granting summary judgment in
circumstances where each individual piece of evidence fails to point to
conspiracy, rather than viewing the record as a whole (including
communication and noncommunication evidence). Again, courts may
only seek the existence of communication and ignore everything else.8
As a result, a communication requirement may well become an
unintended shortcut to summary judgment because courts may look
only for traditional, explicit "communication" of intent and agreement;
i.e., Company A telling Company B it intends to raise its prices and
Company B verbally or in writing agreeing to do the same. Add to this
a requirement that plaintiffs also produce evidence of communication
demonstrating conspirators' reliance on their co-conspirators'
intentions, then the hurdle for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment
effectively would be set at the level of direct evidence of conspiracy,
akin to defendants' admission that they agreed to fix prices. This would
reverse almost a century of the courts' interpretations of Sherman Act
section 1.
In reality, a communication requirement does little to assist courts in
determining whether plaintiffs have satisfied their burden on the issue
8. I note that Professor Page, contrary to the Supreme Court's standard of viewing the
evidence as a whole, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, appears to assert the propriety of
considering the inferences raised by each individual piece of evidence. See William H. Page,
Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 417 (2007) (stating that despite
the principle of Continental Ore, courts should not compartmentalize the evidence,
"[nlevertheless, each component must have some tendency to support the inference of concerted
action"). Professor Page goes further, however, invoking Judge Posner's statement in Fructose
that "zero plus zero equals zero" in support of this view. I submit, however, that this is not Judge
Posner's position, as the next statement in his opinion reveals. He continues that, because
evidence can be susceptible of different interpretations, the question for the jury is, "when the
evidence was considered as a whole," whether "it was more likely that defendants had conspired
to fix prices than that they had not conspired to fix prices." Fructose, 295 F.3d at 655-56.
Professor Page later recognizes this, see Page supra, at 448, but qualifies the statement by saying
(and attributing to Judge Posner) that courts should not reject individual bits of evidence because
each individually is insufficient to avoid summary judgment, "so long as bits of evidence are not
wholly without weight on the issue of agreement." Page supra, at 448. This does not appear to
be Judge Posner's qualification, however; he says only that "[t]he question is simply whether this
evidence, considered as a whole and in combination with the economic evidence, is sufficient to
defeat summary judgment." Fructose, 295 F.3d at 661.
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of concerted action. If antitrust law is to continue to permit plaintiffs to
prove agreement with circumstantial evidence, courts still will be faced
with the dilemma of how much and what kind of evidence is sufficient
to infer that "communication" occurred. Professor Page ultimately
concedes the point in the second half of his article, where he analyzes
three recent cases decided on summary judgment, Fructose, Flat Glass,
and Williamson Oil. He begins his discussion with the observation that
"[i]ncluding communication of intentions and reliance in the definition
of concerted action does not tell us what sorts of communications
satisfy the definition, nor does it tell us what evidence would be
sufficient to prove that the requisite communications had taken place."
9
His following analysis appears to differ little from the current standard
requiring courts to consider the record as a whole rather than focus on
the probative value of a single piece of evidence. For example, in
discussing the probative value of private information exchanges,
Professor Page asserts that the meaning of particular communications
will often depend on other evidence in the case, 10 and the various case
citations that follow in the article uniformly examine competitors'
behavior as a whole, including communications, to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to raise an inference of agreement.
11
Perhaps by advocating a communication requirement, Professor Page
really is not advocating anything new, but simply is trying to
standardize what is necessarily a fact-intensive analysis. The danger of
such standardization is clear, however. Courts may be tempted to
abandon the admonition of Continental Ore1 2 and attempt to determine
the relative worth of each piece of conflicting evidence to satisfy the
communication requirement rather than commending that task to the
jury. In short, the perceived problem with the Matsushita standard may
9. Page, supra note 8, at 440.
10. Id. at 454.
11. I note that, in his discussion of Fructose, Professor Page cites Judge Posner as "stress[ing]
at several points [in the Fructose opinion] that any agreement must have involved secret
communications to reach consensus on list prices." Page, supra note 8, at 450-51. There is no
citation to the Fructose opinion for this proposition, and while Judge Posner refers to
"'communications" early in the opinion, he does not appear to modify that term with "secret."
This is an important point because it illustrates the ease with which the word "communication"
can be misused to set the proof bar too high, and thus demonstrates the danger of introducing
"communication" as an essential element of proof.
12. Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962) (holding that
"[iln cases such as this, plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly
compartmentalizing the various factual components, , . . the character and effect of a conspiracy
are not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as
a whole .... and in a case like [this], the duty of the jury was to look at the whole picture and not
merely at the individual figures in it") (citations omitted).
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remain unsolved, but a communication requirement would simply graft
onto the old standard a new, unnecessary, and confusing standard,
which may be misperceived as providing certainty at the expense of a
history of legal interpretation that, by and large, has served well in civil
antitrust litigation.
